Professor Jeong Yeol Kim recently published his solo-authored paper, "Delegation and Strategic Collusion under Antitrust Policies," in an A-ranked journal, China Economic Review (Cite Score: 10.6, Impact Factor: 5.2, H-Index: 101). This study was funded by a grant from the U.S. National Science Foundation in 2022-2024 and was selected as the Winner by Readers' Choice at the 2023 Antitrust Writing Awards. The paper challenges the traditional assumption of profit maximization in collusion models, arguing that real-world collusion may deviate from this standard framework. By employing a laboratory experiment setting, the study demonstrates that in a delegation structure involving shareholders and firm operators (CEOs and executives), the formation rates of both explicit and tacit collusion in the market may differ from those predicted by traditional models.

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1043951X25000197